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Abstract
This paper investigates how audiences are coping with digital platforms in their 
everyday lives. Empirically grounded in focus groups carried out in Denmark 
with a total of 34 participants of different ages and educational backgrounds, we 
present the results of an analysis of audiences’ coping tactics in relation to track-
ing data, collecting data and mining data. Based on the analysis, we find four 
overall tactics: coping by absence, coping by trust, coping by minimizing risk and 
coping by apathy. We argue that these different coping tactics are employed differ-
ently depending on the context of the digital routines, the data collected (sensitive 
vs. non-sensitive data), and the dependence of the platform (private vs. public, 
national vs. international platforms and apps). These contextual factors are pre-
sented in an analytical model—a coping compass—for studying individual users’ 
coping tactics in their datafied everyday lives.
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Introduction
In most of the world, internet connectivity and associated digital literacies are increas-
ingly necessary in the activities and functions of everyday life. Practices such as searching 
for information, communicating with friends, shopping, and many more activities and 
routines of everyday life are extensively mediated through digital platforms based on data 
processing codes and algorithms.
The increasing reliance on digital services produces vast amounts of behavioural data 
that service providers exploit in order to maximize profit. The phenomenon that enables 
this commercial exploitation of user data has been referred to as datafication, defined as 
“the transformation of social action into online quantified data, thus allowing for real-
time tracking and predictive analysis” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013, p. 198). Some 
researchers argue that datafication is based on a misguided ideology (van Dijck, 2014), 
while others believe that the datafication of user data is an intrusive and manipulative 
threat to democracy (Zuboff, 2019). An increasing number of studies are exploring data-
fication in many domains of everyday life, including health (Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2017), 
governance and policing (Dencik et al., 2018; Smith & O’Malley, 2017), everyday spatiality 
(Sumartojo et al., 2016) and sport (Millington & Millington, 2015). The research on datafi-
cation has provided us with important knowledge about how different populations and 
domains are using data and the possible consequences thereof. However, with this study, 
we wish to direct attention to the potential agency of the users of digital platforms.
In the context of this study, we approach datafication as the rendering of everyday 
practices into data and we ask how people act upon the experiences they have in their 
encounters with data in everyday life. Thus, by means of a bottom-up approach, this 
article seeks to direct scholarly attention towards ordinary users’ self-reflexive percep-
tion and discursive articulation of their everyday datafied practices. We operationalize 
these articulations analytically as coping tactics, inspired by de Certeau’s (1988) definition 
of tactics as practices of resistance and appropriation by the seemingly less powerful in 
response to asymmetric structures of power.
Previous research has identified a privacy calculus for assessing the pros and cons 
of media use, while also noting a privacy paradox (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016; Young & 
Quan-Haase, 2013) based on a misalignment between users’ discursive concern for pri-
vacy issues related to datafication and their everyday practice on social media platforms. 
This article contributes to the body of literature by including public service platforms, 
private digital services and apps in the empirical scope. Following the expansion in scope, 
we present a coping tactics compass, which provides further evidence and nuanced 
understanding of the factors involved in the weighing of the the pros and cons as they are 
experienced by the users themselves. 
Focusing on coping tactics as forms of resistance directs us towards the smaller acts 
which happen in the flow of the everyday but nevertheless constitute agency on the part 
of the users (Picone et al., 2019). The views from the users are presented in the analytical 
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part of this article, presenting four types of coping and appropriation tactics found across 
the material. Before presenting the four coping tactics as an analytical framework, we 
briefly situate our research in relation to existing literature.
The literature on everyday experiences of datafication
As Kennedy (2018, p. 18) argues, little attention has been paid to “ordinary, non-expert 
folks’ thoughts and feelings about how their data are used, shared, and acted upon”, 
which, according to Kennedy, “is as true in data practice and data policymaking as it is 
in academic research into the growth of big and small data”. Kennedy points out that 
although there have been a few surveys on public attitudes, these surveys focus over-
whelmingly on single issues such as privacy and surveillance: she calls for a “much more 
qualitative understanding of how different people experience, negotiate, trust, distrust, or 
resist big data and data mining” (Kennedy, 2018, p. 18).
Initial attempts have been made. For instance, Kennedy herself, together with col-
leagues in Norway and Spain, has examined users’ attitudes towards data mining through 
scenarios in focus groups, concluding that almost all participants responded negatively 
to the fact that Facebook ignores users’ privacy settings when giving information to third 
parties, but evaluations of scenarios differed otherwise. For many respondents, attitudes 
seemed to be influenced by factors related to the fairness of data mining practices, such 
as the sensitivity of the information, the purpose for which the information is used, and 
whether or not the user is aware of the monitoring (Kennedy et al., 2017, p. 280). 
Bolin and Andersson Schwarz’s (2015) study of media companies’ user interpretation 
and institutional translation of big data (so-called “heuristics of the algorithm”) includes 
an examination of media users’ perception of their changing roles in the present infor-
mation society (Bolin and Andersson Schwarz, 2015, p. 10). Through focus groups and 
individual interviews with Swedish media users about “online media use, questions of 
privacy, digital tracking, the benefits and downsides of SNS use, etc.”, Bolin and Anders-
son Schwarz (2015) show how “a dialectic of the digital” presents itself “as an opportunity 
structure (or informational possibility), and as a burden (or restraint)” (p. 6). The focus of 
their study was again on social media sites, but it captured the complexities involved in 
users’ negotiation of this dialectic.
Elsewhere, this observation has been described as “information asymmetry” (Brunton 
& Nissenbaum, 2015, p. 3, quoted in Pangrazio & Selwyn, 2018, p. 420), where the data 
about us are collected in circumstances we may not understand, for purposes we may 
not understand, and are used in ways we may not understand, and it has initiated appeals 
for developing user-citizens’ data literacy (e.g. Gray et al., 2018; Pangrazio & Selwyn, 2018). 
Andrejevic (2014), who similarly conceptualizes this asymmetry as a “big data divide”, has 
demonstrated how the lack of knowledge “about possible uses of personal information 
and the absence of any discernible negative impact of these uses” (p. 1682), alongside 
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a lack of options, leaves people with an “expressed sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the 
arrangements that structure the collection and use of personal information” (ibid.). Based 
on a national telephone survey in Australia and individual and focus group interviews, 
Andrejevic reached the conclusion that “despite the persistent focus on privacy issues in 
both academic research and popular press coverage, privacy arguably takes a backseat 
to an underlying sense of powerlessness” (ibid.). Similarly, “digital resignation” has been 
suggested by Draper and Turow (2019) as a rational response to consumer surveillance. 
They further argue that routine corporate practices encourage this sense of helpless-
ness (Draper & Turow, 2019). However, in this paper, we want to focus specifically on the 
agency of users in situations which might be considered difficult and troublesome for 
users, but to a varying degree are conceptualized as tactics.
In the literature, special interest has been shown in what has been labelled the ‘privacy 
paradox’ (see Gerber et al., 2018, for a literature review), which refers to studies that show 
how privacy of personal data is an important issue, and yet users rarely make an active 
effort to protect their data and often even give it away voluntarily (Gerber et al., 2018, p. 
226). This is, of course, accompanied by a wide range of critical claims that users’ control 
over the processing of their data appears mostly lost (Bottis & Bouchagiar, 2018), that 
existing privacy regimes inadequately address current big data challenges (Crawford & 
Schultz, 2014), and that the binary choice given by online privacy notices of either con-
senting or abandoning a desired service was not what privacy architects envisioned (Cate 
& Mayer-Schonberger, 2013).
Dencik and Cable (2017) examined attitudes among the public and among activists 
following the Snowden leak, arguing that the lack of transparency, knowledge and control 
over what happens to personal data online has led to feelings of widespread resignation, 
not consent, to the status quo that speaks to a condition they identify as “surveillance 
realism”. They understand this to entail an unease among citizens about data collection 
alongside the simultaneous active normalization of surveillance that limits the possibility 
of enacting modes of citizenship and of imagining alternatives (Dencik & Cable, 2017).
Insights such as these have led some researchers to focus on data anxieties, these being 
“the anxieties that are experienced, expressed and imagined both in the datafied pres-
ent and as yet unknown datafied futures” (Pink et al., 2018, p. 3). According to Pink and 
her colleagues, trust is an associated concept in this context, since it is through trust, 
generated by everyday improvisatory actions, that these anxieties are eased. Thus, Pink 
et al. (2018, p. 3), departing from a design anthropological theory, define trust as “a feel-
ing that specifically refers to the ability to be able to move on and do something in the 
immediate future. It need not involve absolute certainty, but entails feeling and knowing 
enough to be able to take the next step”. Empirically, Pink and her colleagues undertook 
ethnographic fieldwork at sites in Barcelona and Melbourne, which host communities 
of individuals, companies and organizations with a focus on emerging technologies. The 
researchers focused on the element of “the anxieties associated with the kinds of every-
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day data that people handle in the course of their mundane daily routines of home and 
work life” (Pink et al., 2018, p. 4), showing how their participants experienced and articu-
lated such anxieties, as well as the measures, trade-offs and tricks people undertake to 
cope with them, and how people are subsequently able to trust that their data will be 
sufficiently safe. Thus, Pink et al. (2018) advance “a processual theory of trust that maps 
out how people cope with the inevitable uncertainty and contingency of the emergent 
circumstances of everyday life” (p. 12).
From these studies, we can draw firstly that people are feeling a sort of unease about 
their datafied practices; secondly, that the users are negotiating the pros and cons in this 
dialectic process; and thirdly, that knowledge or lack of knowledge plays a role. 
While this vast body of literature and approaches to big data and trust certainly 
meet Kennedy’s (2018) call for a more qualitative approach, much work is still needed to 
understand how people experience and negotiate their encounters with powerful actors’ 
data collection, data analysis, searches, sorting and predicting in their everyday lives. The 
study by Pink et al. (2018) is focused on data storage and the participants were primarily 
tech-savvy and already interested in technology as a part of their job. However, we wish 
to contribute to lay people’s (people of different ages and backgrounds) everyday dealing 
with data in the broader sense, not just data storage, but also data mining on the part of 
companies and platforms who collect and utilize data for commercial and non-commer-
cial purposes. The focus on everyday tactics is useful in the context of this study; however, 
as we build our theoretical framework around de Certeau’s (1988) notion of coping tac-
tics, we are more concerned with what matters for how non-expert citizens experience 
and cope with data anxieties in their everyday lives.
Hence, in this study, we wish to examine these diverse practices in a broader context 
of digital platforms; we also aim to move beyond privacy and surveillance issues and ques-
tions of knowledge. In the next section, we elaborate on how we understand such tactics 
in datafied everyday life theoretically. 
Theoretical framework: Everyday resistance tactics
The internet is a complex and networked infrastructure within which users must navigate 
and devise “ways of operating or doing” the everyday (de Certeau, 1988, p. 11). The online 
infrastructure is designed by powerful media institutions (such as Google and Facebook), 
who develop sophisticated strategies to control and manipulate users and the data they 
provide. However, the users of online services are not simply subjected to such strategies 
passively or without power. In his discussion of everyday life practices, de Certeau (1988) 
noted how tactics are commonly employed by people (in their capacity as consumers, 
readers, audiences and so forth) to shape or influence constrained environments (e.g. 
technical, economic or political systems) and practices. Tactics are described as practices 
of resistance and appropriation enacted against the strategies of larger and more power-
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ful systems and actors. As de Certeau made clear, consumers and users are not passive—
they work within the systems in which they find themselves, and appropriate and subvert 
their practices through various tactics of “making do” (de Certeau, 1988). According to 
Willson (2017) it is the intersection of institutions’ strategies and users’ tactics that lends 
shape to everyday life (Willson, 2017, p. 140). 
An example of the increasingly complex development of control strategies is the 
algorithms used by many online services and social media platforms. Like Willson (2017), 
we understand algorithms to hold a potential to operate semi-autonomously by algorith-
mic delegation, a term developed from Latour’s work (Latour & Johnson, 1998). Thus, the 
delegated execution of everyday practices is understood to be accomplished by default, 
without the need for interaction with, or knowledge of, human users or operators (Will-
son, 2017). Algorithmic delegation strives to work smoothly and unobtrusively, but this 
is not simply motivated by the service provider’s ambition to make the user experience 
more convenient and gratifying. Algorithmic delegation can also be interpreted as a 
systemic attempt to strategically obscure the datafication and unrestrained colonization 
of the everyday lifeworld (Couldry & Mejias, 2018). Dencik and Cable (2017) use the term 
“chilling effects” (p. 764) to describe moments when users become aware of data surveil-
lance and choose to moderate their own online behaviour. In this sense, a chilling effect 
may have a pacifying effect or create a sense of resignation in users. However, through the 
understanding of everyday online tactics, research can adopt a more active and nuanced 
understanding of users’ response to institutional strategies. While we acknowledge the 
need to take a critical approach to powerful actors, we argue that it is just as important 
to acknowledge the agency of users beyond surveillance and privacy issues. This perspec-
tive is rather overlooked in the dominating critical theoretical approach to datafication, 
as surveillance and privacy studies tend to render the individual powerless in the face of 
a systemic power—i.e. “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2019). In this article, we question 
the view of the powerless, anxious user on the one hand and the autonomous invisible 
algorithms on the other by specifically focusing on the practices of the users as produc-
tive resistance and appropriation in their datafied everyday lives.
Methodology
This study is based on four focus groups of between four and nine participants conducted 
in Roskilde, Denmark, in autumn 2018 and spring 2019. The focus groups had a total of 34 
participants, who were male and female citizens of Denmark divided into mixed groups 
according to age (ages 18–35 and ages 35–60) and education level (0–3 years of educa-
tion/3 or more years of education beyond secondary school). The four groups were sepa-
rated according to age and education in order to increase homogeneity and productivity 
in group discussions (Bloor et al., 2012) while allowing comparison across the groups. 
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The material is part of a larger project on the datafication of everyday lives carried out at 
Roskilde University.
The demographics of these groups are not statistically representative in any sense; rather, 
they collectively represent a cross-section of society. In this respect, the categories are not 
entirely mutually exclusive. As Barbour and Kitzinger (1999, p. 7) put it, focus groups “encom-
pass diversity and compose a structure” that is guided by the research questions. However, 
we have deliberately organized the focus groups to allow us to consider the nuances of 
diversity with regard to understanding, attitudes and experiences (Kitzinger, 1994).
Denmark has a high adoption rate of the internet in general (97%) and Facebook in 
particular (73%). Furthermore, the Danish population has a high level of trust in estab-
lished news institutions in general and public service channels in particular (Newman 
et al., 2018). Apart from the media institutions, Danish citizens also have high trust in 
government institutions in general, as well as high GDP and education levels based on a 
strong welfare state system (OECD, 2019). 
Our focus groups were initiated with a broad discussion on everyday use and habits 
on a number of different digital platforms and services. Each time the participants men-
tioned a new digital service or platform that had not been brought up before, we asked 
them to note this down on a Post-it, which was put on a wall. In the next phase, we dis-
cussed the concept of trust in institutions and platforms by rating some of the platforms 
with regard to trust and usage. This was done in order to open up the discussion on how 
they were coping with mistrust and data anxieties. The last phase was more specifically 
about coping tactics. To encourage discussion, we provided screenshots of consent forms 
and cookie policies, as well as e-mails about GDPR from various institutions. 
The focus groups where recorded, transcribed and read by all researchers involved in 
the project. After this, we discussed the emerging key coping strategies from the inter-
views together and related them to key theories and research questions. The participants 
are anonymized in the analysis.
In the remaining part of the article we present the results of the analysis. The first 
part presents the coping tactics in terms of resistance strategies towards the datafica-
tion of everyday life. The four overall coping tactics are: 1) coping by disconnection; 2) 
coping by minimizing risk; 3) coping by trust; and 4) coping by apathy. Following this, we 
discuss how these tactics are related to the contextual factors of evaluated dependence 
and evaluated risk of their datafied practices, and we present the analytical model of 
the coping compass to illustrate how the coping tactics relate differently to each of the 
contextual factors. 
Coping by disconnection
First of all, we had a small group of people who were coping by disconnecting from digital 
platforms. They felt so worried about how they were profiled, surveyed, etc. that they 
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chose not to be on digital platforms if they could avoid it. The problem for these people 
was that many platforms could not be avoided—for example, those belonging to the 
Danish government regarding schools or health. The participants thus had to cope with 
this in a similar way to those participants who did not cope with data anxiety by discon-
necting, instead engaging but being fully aware of the paradox that this entailed. The data 
material showed that being absent was often about maintaining control of one’s digital 
presence, as this female participant describes:
So, basically, I think that nobody really knows what happens with big data. I think there 
are many who would like to say that they know a whole lot, and I also think that there are 
a whole lot of stories that we can’t really sort through either. And I don’t like that. I don’t 
feel comfortable when I don’t know what the truth is and when I can’t navigate. And just 
because you are a little smart person with a computer, you can fool me or something 
because I do not have the knowledge myself. I do not like that. So that’s actually what 
makes me abstain from it. And it’s not because I don’t want to, because I really want to 
be modern and things like that. It is not at all. But uh, I just haven’t ... it’s out of my control 
(Older group, higher education, IP1).
She explains how she is not on Facebook, and is absent from social media in general, 
because she feels she cannot know what will happen to her data and feels a sort of asym-
metry of power, where the platform providers are trying to con her. It was quite clear that 
she had a very low level of trust, and the many cases of data leaks she could refer to just 
confirmed her decision to be absent. However, this participant also emphasized several 
times how she did not feel she needed Facebook in her everyday life, apart from when her 
daughter recently had to join a club which demanded that her mother had a Facebook 
profile, as the daughter was too young.
A more minimal disconnection coping strategy was detoxing, or avoiding using a 
specific platform for a period. For example, one younger participant told how he removed 
the Facebook app every couple of months and would then install it again. This showed 
how the participants are navigating between, on the one hand, dependence on the plat-
forms, as they are being used for school, work or other activities that the participants are 
a part of; and, on the other hand, the fear of their data being used for purposes beyond 
their control. 
In a similar example, we see how the chilling effect is experienced twofold. Firstly, 
as above, these effects differ in various social circumstances. For example in relation to 
privacy in the immediate social network—for example, your partner not finding out what 
Christmas present you have bought for him or her; and secondly, in relation to fears of 
surveillance by the digital platforms, as this participant explains on her feeling of weird-
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I think it’s weird because it’s like it’s persecuting me, and I don’t think it’s something I’ve 
said yes to, where the streaming services I’ve signed a concent form and subscribed, and 
Borger.dk I have also said yes, to online banking and so on. But this, so it is not something I 
remember saying yes to. And it is very cool to say that it now takes 1 hour and 14 minutes 
to work on a job today. And you just think ‘how do you know I’m going to Nykøbing Falster 
today?’ It’s not every day I drive to Nykøbing Falster (Older group, higher Education, IP2).
Coping by disconnection was not only a chosen strategy in relation to social media 
platforms, but also in relation to specific sites that were not trusted, such as the Chinese 
shopping site Wish. This participant explains how she gets annoyed with them seemingly 
knowing what she needs before she knows it herself:
It’s like, ‘oh yeah, isn’t your need just to have this thing shaped like Batman?’ No, it is f* not. 
It is too unethical in a way. And I’m pretty sure they probably have a giga database with a 
lot of information. I don’t want to be part of it. So, I made the choice, that I do not have to 
(Older group, higher education, IP2).
When choosing not to act, much of the reflection on this form of engagement revolved 
around identity-driven issues rather than content-driven ones. By this, we mean that dis-
connection can be seen as a productive practice, in that it takes a conscious and substan-
tial effort to refrain from being present on these platforms, which only seems possible 
when it comes to platforms where dependence is low—for example, shopping sites and 
social media platforms. On the other hand, when risk is perceived as high—for example, 
involving data about their health—the participants were inclined to trust that the 
organization or platform would keep their data safe and refrain from using the data for 
purposes to which the participants had not given permission or consent. Before we take 
a closer look at coping by trust, we will present how some data anxieties led the partici-
pants to engage in ways that could minimize the risk they felt that these platforms posed.
Coping by minimizing risks
The second strategy we found in the material was chosen as a consequence of being too 
dependent but nevertheless wanting to feel less worried. Coping by minimizing risk is 
thus characterized by the usage of various digital platforms but engaging in specific ways 
to avoid putting oneself ‘at risk’. ‘Risk’ usually referred to other people obtaining data or 
content about them that they felt was private, or their data being used in ways that were 
not able to control. Such a tactic involved making themselves invisible—for example, the 
participants talked about how they would put a sticker on their camera, delete cookies or 
use secret browsing. When asked directly, though, the participants felt ambivalent about 
deleting cookies, as these were sometimes also an advantage for example remembering 
previous searches and so on. These coping acts were also about getting ‘fair’ treatment, 
as the participants felt that the algorithms would show them a price according to previ-
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ous searches they had done. This participant explains why he is deleting cookies, but the 
quote also illustrates that he is in doubt whether it has any effect:
Yes, I do [delete cookies] because I don’t want them to have information about me all the 
time. But I don’t know if they have the data anyway. So, you become like that ... I think that 
maybe I’m not here a little bit, I’m trying to be safe… (Younger group, higher education, 
IP6).
We see the ambivalence between being dependent on usage but trying to minimize the 
risk felt by using the platforms. Ambivalence was also seen in the ways these tactics were 
talked about: they at times described themselves as “someone with a tin foil-hat.” For 
example, this participant explained why it is important to turn off the geolocation setting 
on her phone:
But I would also say, without it sounding really silly, but I do not have my mobile turned 
on geo-tracking either. The fact that it can track where I am. I think that is totally creepy 
(Older group, higher education, IP1).
We see in the material that the participants are aware of the paradox of posting, because 
something seems private—for example, the Messenger app—and at the same time they 
know that it is never completely private. This participant, for example, explains how it 
would be too much if he had to go around worrying all the time, so he chooses just to 
have a critical approach:
Now, all I post is private—after all, it is for the ones who are my alleged friends, the ones 
I think have an interest in seeing these things. But, of course, you change and try to give 
it a little more critical sense, but I can’t manage to be scared all the time. I cannot (Older, 
higher education, IP3). 
The minimizing risk coping tactic also involved things like saying no to things by default—
for example, pop up boxes, non-posting—that is, mainly lurking on platforms but not 
posting anything yourself. This involved carefully selecting what information the plat-
forms can and cannot have, but again we see in this quote that the risk is not so much 
related to what the data are being used for, but to protect themselves from identity theft, 
or to avoid someone being able to figure out that their house is empty: 
But I’m not putting stuff up about my holiday, for example, cause imagine who can then 
see that I’m on holiday and commits that famous burglary despite all the alarms we have, 
right? So, I have no confidence in Facebook. I’m pretty sure they sell all my information, 
so it’s my job not to give them much. But it’s okay that they know that I am a woman and 
when I have a birthday. I don’t care… (Older, Higher education, IP4).
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One participant explained having a second email for platforms or apps that she wants 
to use but where she wants to avoid her email being used by the platform to send out 
advertising, etc:
So, I would say that I actually created a specific email for those things, which is one only 
for some shitty websites which I do not trust. The reason for this is that you know that 
newsletters and stuff like that come in. And it’s not on ... I have a work email and then I 
have another email, which I never use for those profiles. So, I have one just set up for that… 
(Younger group, lower education, IP2).
In this way, the participant creates a sort of alter ego and thereby displaces the risk or 
annoyance she feels to an alternative email inbox. Similar to this, a minimizing coping 
strategy was to outsource the risk-taking to others. One participant completely relied 
on her husband’s internet setup and security settings, but still complained that she felt 
exposed and worried, because they had security cameras installed everywhere in the 
house. Another participant similarly felt less at risk because his workplace had “high 
security”. In this way, minimizing risk means that the participants avoided data anxieties 
because they transferred the responsibility to other people whom they felt were more 
knowledgeable and capable than themselves. As we see, both the disconnection strategy 
and the minimizing strategy are linked to an absence of trust in the digital platforms and 
their capabilities to protect the data. But we also see that disconnection and non-usage 
are chosen as tactics where the participants do not feel dependent—for example, if work 
or school somehow forces them to have a profile on Facebook. The third tactic is, in con-
trast, linked to actively choosing to trust. 
Coping by trust
Coping by trust came in many forms but was most often mentioned in relation to plat-
forms of a certain size. The argument seemed to be, on the one hand, that if the platform 
is of a certain size, like Facebook, then it will have so much of people’s data that it will be 
able to protect it. On the other hand, trust was often the chosen coping strategy when 
platforms connected to state ownership, such as tax, health or apps connected to edu-
cation, were discussed, as everyone agreed that the data were much more sensitive (i.e. 
personal) and that these platforms could not be avoided. These platforms and services 
were described in a much more positive manner, and possible data mining was accepted 
by and large as it could “help society”—for example, by detecting diseases or families 
with problems. This participant explains why she is not worried about the data traces she 
leaves on platforms owned by the government:
I think that’s because it is the government who is sending the information. And okay, it 
may well be that they collect our data for something, but I don’t think there’s an unethical 
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purpose behind it. So, they also have all my personal information already, so, what else do 
they want to know? How often I open my e-box (a nationally created platform for receiv-
ing e-mails from the public sector)? I don’t mind them knowing that (Older group, higher 
education, IP2).
Again, we see the participant negotiating the risk in the type of data given to the plat-
form and the level of faith in the authorities not to use these data for unethical purposes, 
though without specifying what such purposes might be. Along the same lines, we saw 
how the participants used past experiences as a point of reference. This was in both posi-
tive and negative terms—either “I have never experienced that they have used my data 
in ways that I did not expect them to” or “I heard this about the data leak, so I did this…”. 
These past experiences also relied on the specific relationship with platforms, such as the 
school or the bank, which were seen as institutions that could be trusted because they 
also had an interest in maintaining a good relationship. As this participant describes:
And I want to say, as far as online banking is concerned, we are already in an offline dia-
logue with them about our finances, you have to have a loan, or your child’s savings and so 
on. And then, I would say that it is a sort of relationship of trust that you have entered into 
with your bank, and therefore I trust that they use my data, but it is also a cooperation, 
which I myself have agreed to (Older group, short education, IP2).
Coping by apathy
We have chosen to name the last of the coping tactics that we found in the material 
‘coping by apathy’. It involves the participants shrugging it off, but in two different ways, 
or for two different reasons. Some participants were reluctant to accept that the risk 
noted by other participants, existed, mostly because they did not think the data were 
sensitive or because it even was an advantage to engage with these services, which would 
come to know them and, for example, give them better film recommendations.
I am not too scared about it floating around the web—well, then, you have my personal 
number. What can they use it for? They can use it to scam something, but I think about 
insurance more often. Do I have the option of replacing things if this happens? (Older 
group, higher education, IP3).
I would say, if they have my email or login, they could threaten me, but they cannot 
threaten me with my preferences in films (Younger group, lower education, IP4).
As the quotes show, these participants are not so worried about film preferences or even 
their personal number being online unless the data are being used for swindling or similar. 
Others, though, were much more worried—however, again distinguishing between the 
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If they [Facebook] track my messages, it wouldn’t surprise me that they do. So, they are not 
very exciting, my messages, but I have no confidence. I would not write my CPR number or 
bank details. I would never write that in Messenger (Older group, lower education, IP5).
Apathy also involves imagining the worst case, even though, as this participant expresses, 
his knowledge is insufficient and he has no way of finding out if Facebook is tracing his 
Messenger. So, it helps him to imagine that they do, emphasizing that he does not care 
that they “listen in”, except if they get access to his personal number. But apathy as a 
coping tactic could also be seen when participants actually felt at risk but nevertheless 
felt unable to do anything about it. Hence, we found a form of acceptance of the com-
plexities, as the participants become aware that the little room for minimizing risk is likely 
to be insufficient to cover their data traces. This is, of course, linked to the “feeling of 
powerlessness” found by Andrejevic (2014, p. 1675) and the “surveillance realism” found 
by Dencik and Cable (2017, p. 764). As this participant expresses, it is simply too hard to 
be worried all the time:
I simply reach some point where I say that if I am so scared then I cannot use these plat-
forms. I can simply no longer accommodate. So, I have to be an optimist, and then I have 
to be happy and a little naive and say that: ‘Yes, I am as careful as I possibly can be ... ‘(Older 
group, higher education, IP4).
Contextual factors: A coping compass for navigating the data anxieties 
Above, we have seen complex negotiations of how to navigate the data anxieties, but two 
important contextual factors emerged in the material. We argue that many of the digital 
services and platforms that were mentioned by the participants differ in terms of how 
dependent the participants are on these platforms. Being dependent is also relational, 
however, and while some participants might feel dependent on Facebook, others might 
not. The other contextual factor that comes into play is the risk evaluation, as pointed out 
by Hargittai and Marwick (2016), in that the participants weigh the pros and cons—more 
specifically, they evaluate the risk according to the type of data and the type of platform 
they are engaging with. As such, if you perceive the platform to be high risk, you will 
attend to the sort of data you feel comfortable giving the platform, whereas this evalu-
ation becomes less important if the data are non-sensitive to the participants, such as 
their shoe size or film preferences. The important thing is that if the participants at times 
evaluated the platform as a combination of being of low trust and the data non-sensitive, 
then they would either try to minimize or shrug their shoulders. These evaluations and 
the coping tactics chosen are illustrated in Figure 1, the coping compass.
MedieKultur 69
24
Jannie Møller Hartley and Sander Andreas Schwartz
Article: Trust, Disconnection, Minimizing risk and Apathy
Figure 1. The compass of coping tactics in datafied everyday life
The compass enables an analysis of individual users and their coping tactics in relation 
to specific digital platforms and apps, moving from left to right or up and down on the 
continuum of dependence coping and the continuum of risk coping.
In the upper left quadrant, we found the participants often only chose trust as a tactic 
when they were dependent on the platform, such as a school app or the nationally crea-
ted app and platform for receiving letters from public authorities (named E-box). They did 
not necessarily perceive these platforms as high risk, but the data they contained were 
often mentioned as high risk. Similarly to Pink et al. (2018), we found that trust was coher-
ent with a focus on process, emergence and (im)possible rather than predictable futures. 
This therefore involves approaching the concept of trust as a feeling that specifically refers 
to the ability to be able to move on and do something in the immediate future. It need 
not involve absolute certainty, but entails feeling and knowing enough to be able to take 
the next step. Trust, as Pink et al. (2018) argue, is the moment in which we feel sufficiently 
confident to be able to act, whereby “confidence based on familiarity is the foundation of 
getting involved in a situation” and differentiates trust from risk (Fredricksen, 2016, p. 59, 
in Pink et al., 2018, p.3). We found, though, that risk is very much involved in the partici-
pants’ abilities to trust in the immediate future, and that trust is often a necessity related 
to the fact that the participants are dependent on the platforms that they choose to 
trust. However, dependence is also understood here as a ‘feeling’ which  emerges from the 
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discussion of whether one could actually function in a digital society without using many 
such platforms: for some, it would just require too much work to choose disconnection 
as a tactic, even though it would be possible, in theory at least.
In the bottom right corner, the tactic of apathy was employed when users felt little or 
no dependence of the platform and perceived little risk by the usage. For example, plat-
forms like Netflix or the shopping site Zalando were met by a tactic of apathy, as many of 
the participants did not see film preferences or shoe sizes as high-risk data.
Equally, Messenger was mentioned in relation to the ‘shrugging’ done by participants. 
It can seem like a paradox that users engage with platforms that they openly do not trust, 
but here we saw the response of apathy, often because the data  was considered non-
sensitive, therefore making trust irrelevant despite the fact that the participants saw what 
they wrote in Messenger as private. This became apparent in the way the participants 
distinguished between using Facebook and Messenger, essentially the same platform, but 
Messenger was by many seen as less risky than Facebook. Hence, when the participants 
felt they could not trust—i.e. were sufficiently confident to act but were still dependent 
on usage of the platform—they engaged in apathy as a tactic, questioning whether Face-
book is listening in on their Messenger conversations, but being okay about it or down-
playing the riskiness because, as one participant explained: “it’s only for advertising”, or, as 
another said: “it’s only gossip between me and my friends”.
In the upper right quadrant of the compass, we found the tactic of disconnection 
employed, when users were aware of the risk, either of the type of data or the type of 
platform, but were not dependent on using the platform. These were platforms such as 
weather apps, health apps or, for some, even Facebook. For some, the data they produce 
by using the platform is sensitive, like a menstruation cycle, while for others disconnec-
tion was not about the type of data but about past experiences and discourses around 
the platform as high risk. 
Conclusion 
Previous research has identified a “privacy paradox” (Young & Quan-Haase, 2013), show-
ing that users engage in a calculation weighing the pros and cons of online media use in 
order to justify their everyday use and dependence on platforms such as social network 
sites (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016). Furthermore, research on everyday datafication often 
suggests the user as anxious (Pink et al., 2018), powerless (Andrejevic, 2014) or with “feel-
ings of widespread resignation” (Dencik & Cable, 2017, p. 773).
Our article has departed from this by exploring coping beyond social media to include 
platforms and apps such as banking, health and shopping, and by focusing on what Pink 
et al. (2018) have conceptualized as mundane data routines and habits of coping with 
data anxieties, and thus ordinary users’ coping strategies. This has enabled us to see how 
these negotiations are always complex and relational. The framework of algorithmic 
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delegation (Willson, 2017) and user tactics of resistance (de Certeau, 1988) directed our 
gaze towards coping tactics as productive practices and towards the contextual factors, 
illustrated analytically in the coping compass.
By taking a bottom-up approach, following Kennedy et al. (2015) when they encourage 
research to “attend to diverse, individual and subjective responses to everyday tracking” 
(p. 3), this article has identified four types of coping tactic, namely coping by disconnec-
tion, coping by trust, coping by minimizing risk and coping by apathy. While disconnec-
tion is often chosen when the participants evaluate their dependence on the platform 
as low and the cons outweigh the pros, minimizing includes tactics such as not posting, 
lurking, turning off the camera or geo-location. 
We have observed how many of the everyday tactics are not as tactical or strategic 
as the name indicates, but are often about maintaining the flow of everyday life without 
being disturbed by the so-called chilling effects, for example, Google Maps knowing that 
you are likely to drive to work in the morning and how long it will take you to drive there.
Thus, we see the investment has to fit the result, and when feeling at risk participants 
try to “imagine an immediate future” (Pink et al., 2018, p. 3) and hope that it is enough to 
feel safe. 
Similarly to Kennedy et al. (2017) we saw differences between young and old, and 
between educated and less educated, although our data cannot be generalized. It remains 
an important question to examine whether people of different ages and backgrounds 
perceive risk and dependence in different ways, or if similar coping tactics can be found in 
similar groups.
Andrejevic (2014) conceptualizes the asymmetry between the knowledge held by 
big data companies and the lack thereof amongst ordinary people as a “big data divide”, 
leaving people with an “expressed sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the arrangements that 
structure the collection and use of personal information” (p. 1682). Future research could 
study such divides within user groups, in terms of usage of platforms and links to the data 
anxiety experienced by those users. The question is on the one hand how data anxiety 
and coping are ingrained in discourses of datafication and a result of increased complexity 
through datafication? And on the other hand how the intrusiveness of digital platforms 
in people’s everyday lives is making it almost impossible to imagine other futures or even 
to begin to grasp how disconnection could be an option. In other words, how can users 
minimize the future risk of datafication in a present that they do not fully understand?
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